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Abstract 
 
Does corruption have an impact on export diversification? Despite a growing interest from the 
international community regarding the detrimental effects of corruption, the consequences it may have for 
export diversification remain largely unexplored. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if there is a 
relationship between the two and, if so, to determine if certain groups of countries have relatively more to 
gain from combatting corruption.  
 
I conduct my empirical investigation using panel data covering the period 2002-2012 for 157 economies at 
different levels of development. The baseline regression is estimated with the Poisson-pseudo-maximum-
likelihood estimator and several robustness controls using alternative measures of diversification and other 
estimators are performed.  
 
My results imply that corruption has a significant and negative impact on export diversification. 
Moreover, my findings indicate that the magnitude of the effect differs depending on the exporter’s level 
of income and that corruption may be especially detrimental in sub-Saharan Africa. However, these results 
are less robust. Finally, I also find empirical evidence supporting a non-linear relationship between 
corruption and diversification.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The potentially harmful consequences of corruption for economic development have received increasingly 
more attention during recent years from international organisations, governments and aid-donors 
worldwide. However, while a substantial and growing body of research supports a negative relationship 
between corruption and economic growth, few have investigated whether corruption also inhibits export 
diversification.  
 
There are several reasons to why export diversification may be an attractive development objective for 
low- and middle-income countries. For instance, it provides an efficient way of mitigating economic risks 
related to trade shocks. Moreover, exporting a wider range of products is associated with dynamic spill-
over effects that increase productivity and contribute to economic growth. In addition, for countries whose 
exports are concentrated to the natural resource sector, diversification is considered to be an important 
way of generating employment opportunities and thereby alleviating poverty. Finally, diversifying the 
export base is sometimes presented as an option for overcoming the notorious curse of natural resources. 
Despite these beneficial aspects, little is known about which factors that determine export diversification. 
This applies to institutional variables in particular.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether corruption has an impact on export diversification. To 
my knowledge, only three studies have treated the issue before
1
 and these come to different conclusions. 
While Starosta de Waldemar (2010) and Héredia Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010) find that corruption 
impedes diversification, no specific effect is identified by Parteka & Tamberi (2013). Apart from 
providing more empirical evidence and thereby make a contribution to the limited amount of research 
conducted on the topic, I will seek to determine if certain groups of countries have relatively more to gain 
from combatting corruption in terms of export diversification. I consider this to be the key contribution of 
this thesis. 
 
More specifically, my empirical investigation aspires to answer the following questions:  
 
 Does corruption have an impact on export diversification? 
 Does the effect of corruption on export diversification differ depending on the exporter’s level of 
income?  
 Is corruption especially detrimental to export diversification in sub-Saharan Africa?  
                                                        
1 Starosta de Waldemar (2010) ”How Costly is Rent-seeking to Diversification: An Emprical Approach” , Héredia Caldeira 
Cabral & Veiga, (2010) "Determinants of Export Diversification and Sophistication in sub-Saharan Africa”  and Parteka & 
Tamberi (2013) ”What Determines Export Diversification in the Development Process? An Empirical Assessment”. 
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 Is there a non-linear relationship between corruption and export diversification? In other words, 
does the magnitude of the effect vary depending on the level of corruption? 
 
Since the existing literature makes no distinction between the impact of corruption for countries at 
different levels of income or allow for non-linearities in the relationship between corruption and export 
diversification, my study is the first of its kind. From a policy perspective, identifying which groups (if 
any) that have the potential to make significant gains from combatting corruption is highly relevant.  The 
focus on sub-Saharan Africa is reasonable since the commodity-led growth of the 21:st century has largely 
failed to create jobs and reduce poverty. Hence, diversification may be especially important in this region.  
 
In order to conduct my empirical investigation I use panel data covering the period 2002-2012 for 157 
countries at different levels of development. Since no established theoretical model with the purpose of 
explaining which factors that determine diversification exist, my choice of control variables and 
estimation technique is largely guided by previous empirical studies within the field. The baseline 
regression is estimated with the Poisson-pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator, which is has numerous 
desirable robustness properties. In addition, a substantial sensitivity analysis is conducted in order to 
determine whether the results are robust. For instance, controls using other estimators and alternative 
measures of diversification are undertaken.  
 
My empirical results imply that corruption has a negative and robust impact on horizontal and vertical 
export diversification. Furthermore, I find that both low- and middle-income countries can achieve 
substantial diversification gains by combatting corruption, but that the effect is more pronounced for low-
income. Similarly, corruption appears to be especially harmful to diversification in sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, these results are less robust and should be verified by future research. Finally, I find that the 
magnitude of the elasticity depends on the degree of corruption in the exporting country, thus indicating a 
non-linear relationship between corruption and diversification.  
 
The thesis proceeds as follows. In the next section I define export diversification and discuss why it can be 
a desirable strategy for promoting development in low- and middle-income countries. Afterwards, I 
provide theoretical arguments to why corruption may have an impact on export diversification and discuss 
problems related to quantifying corruption. An overview of the existing literature and a description of data 
and methodology are then presented. Finally, I conduct my empirical investigation and analyse the results.  
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2. Export diversification as a strategy for development 
 
I initiate the following chapter by defining export diversification and briefly discuss how it can be 
measured. After that I provide several arguments to why export diversification can promote development 
in low- and middle-income countries. Finally, a section is devoted to sub-Saharan Africa since 
diversification may be especially important on this continent.   
2.1 Definition of export diversification 
 
In the empirical literature, export diversification is often defined as a broadening of the range of products 
that a country exports (Dennis & Shepherd, 2007, p.5) or as an increase in the number of destination 
markets (Bacchetta et al., 2009, p.81). In addition, diversification is sometimes associated with a more 
even distribution of value across an exporter’s goods (Starosta de Waldemar, 2010, p.8). In my thesis, I 
will not treat the geographical dimension.
2
 A distinction can be made between horizontal diversification 
and vertical diversification. Horizontal diversification takes place within the same sector (primary, 
secondary or tertiary) by introducing new products of approximately the same level of sophistication to 
the export mix. For example, if a country specialised in exporting fresh fruit also starts exporting cut 
flowers, horizontal diversification can be said to have occurred. In contrast, vertical diversification 
generally entails moving up the value chain. Structural transformation, during which production gradually 
shifts from agricultural activities into manufacturing, is an example of vertical diversification (Samen, 
2010, p.4-5). For development purposes, both horizontal and vertical diversification are considered to be 
of importance (Herzer & Nowak-Lehnmann, 2006, p. 1-2).  
2.2 Measuring diversification 
 
The level of export diversification can be measured in various ways. One method consists of simply 
counting the number of products that a country exports a given year. This approach is attractive since it 
directly measures diversification as a widening of the export base and is unaffected by price changes on 
the world market. In addition, the technique captures, though imperfectly, both horizontal and vertical 
diversification (Dennis & Shepherd, 2011, p. 103, 107). A potential drawback may be that it treats all 
products as equally important (Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2013, p. 12-13).  
 
An alternative approach entails using a concentration index. In the empirical literature, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) is frequently used. Ranging from 0 to 1, where values close to 1 indicate a high 
level of concentration, the HHI takes on the following form:  
                                                        
2 I acknowledge the importance of geographical diversification for income (Bacchetta et al., 2009) and output (Malik  
& Temple, 2009), but whether corruption has an impact on this dimension of export diversification will have to be a topic for 
future research.  
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The HHI measures the dispersion of trade value across an exporter’s range of products. Hence, a country 
whose export revenues depend heavily on just a few items, and who is therefore more vulnerable to trade 
shocks, will receive a score close to 1 (World Bank, 2013, p.24). Despite the level of vulnerability being 
an interesting, and for development policies relevant, factor to analyse, using a concentration index as a 
measure of export diversification has its limitations. For example, cyclical fluctuations in relative prices 
can have a substantial impact on the index (Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2013, p.13). Rising prices of primary 
commodities make countries who export these appear to be increasingly more concentrated, hence less 
diversified, even though the physical composition of their exports remain exactly the same. 
 
For the purpose of my thesis I find both measures to be of relevance. The number of exported products 
will be my main choice of dependent variable, but I will also run a regression with the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. Due to the fact that they measure slightly different aspects of export diversification, the 
econometric results may differ. In addition, even though my count variable captures vertical 
diversification to a certain extent, it reveals nothing regarding the composition of the export base. Since 
this type of diversification is typically associated with a shift from exporting primary products into 
manufactured goods, I will run a separate regression where I use Manufactures as share of total exports as 
dependent variable. These estimates, along with the ones from the Herfindahl-Hirschman-regression, will 
serve as robustness controls for my baseline regression. 
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Another factor to take into account when measuring export diversification is the level of aggregation of 
the data used. Highly aggregated data may understate the degree of diversification that has taken place 
whereas the opposite has the potential to yield results that are of little economic importance. In the latter 
case a minor modification of a certain item, such as reducing the amount of sugar in strawberry jam, may 
be counted as a new product all together. In my empirical investigation I use data of the three-digit level 
of disaggregation, classified according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). Such 
products often represent more than 0.3% of a country’s total exports or have an export value higher than 
100.000 dollars (UNCTAD, 2014). In consequence, an increase in the number of exported products 
implies that significant export diversification has taken place.  
2.3 Why diversify?  
 
Why discuss export diversification in the first place? According to the supposedly most dominating theory 
within the trade literature, countries should specialise in producing those goods in which they have a 
comparative advantage. By doing so and engaging in trade, resource allocation will become more efficient 
and each country will benefit in terms of higher growth and increased welfare (Krugman & Obstfeld, 
2007, p.28-29, 36-37). Diversifying the export base appears to contradict the Ricardian theory described 
above
3
. However, even though specialisation increases efficiency, there are numerous reasons to why 
developing countries may be interested in diversifying
4
.  
 
First and foremost, diversification is a way of mitigating economic risks. This is a well-known fact within 
the finance literature and is especially relevant for exporters with a comparative advantage in primary 
commodities. For instance, countries whose exports are concentrated to a very narrow range of products 
become vulnerable to external shocks such as a price falls on the world market. The instability of exports 
revenues exacerbates macroeconomic uncertainty and may have a negative impact on economic planning 
and investment, as well as the capacity to import and repay public debts (al-Marhubi, 2000; Herzer & 
Nowak-Lehnmann, 2006; Hesse, 2008; Agosin, 2007). Furthermore, volatile export earnings are 
associated with higher variance of GDP growth. This is problematic since many developing countries have 
little access to global financial markets and hence may not be able to smooth consumption (Osakwe, 2007;  
Agosin, 2007; Amurgo-Pacheco & Pierola, 2008). In addition, boom-and-bust-cycles can have a more 
long-term effect on unemployment. During an economic down-turn, when unemployment rises, the skills 
of the labour force deteriorate, a tendency that often cannot be fully compensated for during the next 
boom. The effect of a temporary contraction may therefore result in hysteresis (Agosin, 2007). Since the 
prices of primary commodities tend to experience more fluctuations than those of manufactures (Bacchetta 
et al., 2009), commodity-exporters are relatively more vulnerable to external shocks. Diversification, both 
                                                        
3 It also contradicts the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. For more information please consult Krugman & Obstfeld (2007). 
4 Hesse (2008) argues that developing countries gain from export diversification whereas richer countries typically benefit from 
specialising.  
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vertical and horizontal, provides a way of stabilising export revenues since it reduces the dependence on a 
few items that, in developing countries, often are subject to high volatility.  
 
In the long term, it is also believed, even though there is no consensus on the matter, that primary product-
exporters face declining terms of trade. The so-called Prebisch-Singer hypothesis from the 1950’s states 
that long term economic growth requires a structural shift away from depending on exporting primary 
commodities into exporting manufactures (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). This process is identical to 
vertical diversification.  
 
Several researchers have emphasized the dynamic effects associated with successful export 
diversification. Herzer & Nowak-Lehnmann (2006) suggest that vertical and horizontal export 
diversification in Chile positively contributed to economic growth through learning-by-doing and 
learning-by-exporting externalities. For instance, the exposure to international competition and the 
interaction with foreign buyers entails knowledge-transfers regarding production techniques, efficient 
organisational structures and use of new technology. When entering the international market, the 
productivity of the export-oriented firms is therefore likely to be enhanced. Moreover, due to spill-over 
effects, the efficiency of other industries within the domestic economy often rises too (Herzer & Nowak-
Lehnmann, 2006). A similar line of reasoning can be found in Al-Marhubi (2000) who emphasises the 
positive role of knowledge-externalities accrued from export diversification. Furthermore, a study by 
Agosin (2007) postulates that countries which broaden their comparative advantage, i.e diversify, 
experience higher growth rates than those whose production is restricted to a limited range of low-
technology goods. One reason to this would be that diversification increases the skills of labourers within 
the new sector, who in turn will train others, whereby productivity increases. Due to the higher levels of 
human capital the probability also rises that people employed within the new sectors will come up with 
new production ideas, which will lead to the start-up of additional industries. Learning externalities arising 
from vertical and horizontal export diversification thus facilitate the emergence of new sectors and are a 
key to getting the growth process started (Agosin, 2007).  
 
Another aspect of export diversification, also relevant for development purposes, concerns job creation. In 
many low- and middle-income countries, exports are highly concentrated to natural resources. In general, 
the extractive industries (oil exploration and mining) are capital-intensive and generate few employment 
opportunities. Moreover, the linkages with the rest of the economy are limited and the revenues typically 
accrue to a restricted enclave if no redistribution takes place (UNECA, 2012, p.39, 50). As I will elaborate 
on at a later stage in this thesis, commodity-led growth has for example largely failed to alleviate poverty 
and reduce unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa. Diversifying into sectors that use a higher ratio of 
labour is an option for achieving more inclusive growth.  
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Finally, during the last thirty years a vast amount of research has treated the so-called natural resource-
curse. For example, in an influential paper Sachs & Warner (1995) argue that countries with an abundance 
of natural resources, mineral and fuels in particular, grow more slowly and have worse development 
outcomes. Grossly simplified, the curse works through both economic and political mechanisms. The 
economic ones include Dutch disease
5
 and income volatility, whereas the political ones are associated 
with various dimensions of worsened governance. Collier & Hoeffler (1998) also find a link between the 
presence of natural resources and a higher incidence of civil war. However, research conducted by 
Lederman & Maloney put the existence of the resource curse into question. They argue that it is not 
natural resources in themselves that are detrimental to economic development, but a high concentration of 
exports (Lederman & Maloney, 2007). Though opinions on the matter differ, diversifying the export base 
is likely to be an important way of overcoming the (elusive?) resource-curse.   
 
In conclusion, though specialization may increase efficiency and be optimal for countries at higher levels 
of development, low- and middle-income economies often have much to gain from diversifying the export 
base.  
2.4 The case of sub-Saharan Africa 
 
While I initially investigate whether corruption has an effect on export diversification in general, I will at 
a later stage test if corruption is especially harmful in sub-Saharan Africa. The regional focus is relevant 
since export diversification is increasingly regarded as an option for promoting inclusive and sustainable 
development on the continent.
6
 
 
Since the early 2000’s Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced relatively rapid economic growth and talk of 
an “African economic renaissance” is frequently heard. However, in general growth has not been inclusive 
and rests on rather fragile foundations. Sub-Saharan exports remain heavily concentrated to primary 
commodities and despite improvements in economic management and increased domestic demand, rising 
commodity prices have been the main driver of the growth-surge (UNECA, 2012, p.33-40, 65- 67; World 
Economic Forum, 2013, p. 1-10).  
 
While impressive growth rates look good on paper, they have little value if they do not translate into better 
living standards for the people. In sub-Saharan Africa, poverty and unemployment remain rampant 
(UNECA, 2014). In 2010, the poverty headcount ratio of people living on less than 1,25 dollars a day 
(PPP) was 48,5% of the sub-Saharan population. In 1990 the figure was 56,5% (World Bank, 2014), so 
                                                        
5 Exporting natural resources leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which makes other exports less 
competitive on the world market (Collier, 2007, p. 39) 
6 For instance, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa refers to diversification as ”a new paradigm for 
Africa’s development” (UNECA, 2007) 
Anna Åberg  12 
some improvement can be observed, but the reduction is not proportional to the economic growth that the 
continent experienced during the period (World Economic Forum, 2013, p. 4). One of the reasons behind 
this disappointing trend is that growth has mainly been driven by capital-intensive sectors. The extractive 
industries provide few employment opportunities and have limited linkages with the rest of the economy. 
Moreover, productivity in the African agricultural sector remains low and a general trend of 
deindustrialisation, where the share of manufactures relative to GDP has deteriorated, can be observed on 
the continent (UNECA, 2012, p. 29, 50; UNECA, 2013, p.4). There are exceptions, but in general export 
diversification remains weak on the continent and compared to other regions sub-Saharan Africa lags 
behind. Similarly, though positive trends within the service and tourism sector can be observed, the 
dependency on exporting natural resources prevails (UNECA, 2013, p.50; UNECA, 2011, p.30).  
 
As emphasised in the Economic report on Africa from 2012, the commodity driven growth has hence so 
far failed to create an adequate amount of jobs and reduce poverty on the continent. The situation becomes 
more acute given the fact that sub-Saharan Africa has a young and rapidly increasing population. 
According to calculations made by the International Monetary Fund, by 2020 more than half of the 
region’s population will be under 25 years of age (IMF, 2014, p.35). In order to avoid social and political 
unrest, sufficient employment opportunities must be generated. The report, along with several others, 
argues that sub-Saharan economies should promote horizontal and vertical diversification
7
 in order to 
create jobs and thereby reduce poverty (UNECA, 2012; UNECA, 2011).   
 
As has been noted earlier in this thesis, lack of export diversification also leaves countries vulnerable to 
external shocks. Fuels and mining-products still dominate sub-Saharan exports, both of which are subject 
to high price volatility on the global market. Even though many countries in region have experienced 
relatively strong economic growth during the 21:st century (largely due to an increasing demand of 
commodities from emerging economies) the variance in the growth rates has been significant (UNECA, 
2011, p. 4, 11-14, 29-33). Furthermore, the depletion of natural resources such as fossil fuels and minerals 
makes a growth strategy based on exporting these unsustainable in the long run. For reasons described 
above, export diversification may be especially important in sub-Saharan Africa, even though other things 
certainly are needed too. In my thesis I aim to investigate whether corruption matters more for export 
diversification in SSA than in other parts of the world.  
 
 
 
                                                        
7 The report speaks of both export diversification and economic diversification (which does not necessarily involve exporting) as 
important strategies for development.  
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3. Corruption as a determinant of export diversification 
 
In this section I provide a few examples of how corruption can be defined and describe some of the 
problems associated with quantifying the concept. Being aware of these difficulties is important when 
analysing and drawing conclusions from studies that, like my own, uses data on corruption. Afterwards I 
will describe some of the mechanisms through which corruption may affect export diversification.  
3.1 What is corruption? 
 
The meaning of corruption is manifold and still no universally accepted definition of the phenomenon 
exists. The World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 
2014a). These gains can be in direct monetary terms in form of a bribe or, for example, involve acquiring 
a desirable position through patronage (OECD, 2013, p.6; Rohwer, 2009, p. 42-43; Tanzi, 1998, p.9). 
While the World Bank’s definition is rather broad, it directly implies that corruption is connected to the 
activities of the state. The economist Vito Tanzi uses a more general definition; “corruption is the 
intentional non-compliance with [the] arm’s-length principle aimed at deriving some advantage from this 
behaviour for oneself or for related individuals” (Tanzi, 1998, p.8). The arm’s-length principle implies 
that all economic agents should be treated the same, regardless of personal or other relationships that may 
interfere. Tanzi also stresses the necessity of intent and that of acquiring an advantage in order for 
corruption to have taken place. Finally, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 
Sida, uses the following definition of corruption; "[the] abuse of trust, power or position for improper 
gain. Corruption includes, among other things, the offering and receiving of bribes – including the bribery 
of foreign officials – extortion, conflicts of interest and nepotism." (Sida, 2014) 
 
Corruption takes on different forms and often affects many levels of society. Due to its illicit nature, it is 
also extremely hard to measure. This is a point I will return to further on. In order to make the concept 
more comprehensible, corrupt activities can be divided into three broad categories; bribery, theft of public 
assets and patronage (OECD, 2013, p.6). Bribery
8
 takes place when an item of value is given or taken 
with the purpose of altering the judgement and behaviour of the recipient. The exchange typically involves 
a state agent and a civilian, where the former misuses his or her position of power. The items of value can, 
for instance, be in form of money, insider information or company shares (Rohwer, 2009, p.42-43; OECD, 
2013, p.6). Theft of public assets often occurs in the form of embezzlement, which can broadly be defined 
as the “theft of resources by people who are responsible for administering them” (Rohwer, 2009, p. 42). 
For instance, if an employee steals from his or her employer, this can be regarded as a type of 
embezzlement. Another example is when a state leader siphons funds out of public coffers and places 
them on his own over-seas bank account. Moreover, political patronage consists of public resources being 
                                                        
8 Equivalent terms to bribery are kick-backs and pay-offs (Rohwer, 2009, p.42) 
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used to reward individuals or specific groups for their electoral support. Related concepts are nepotism 
and cronyism which entail granting special favours to relatives and friends (OECD, 2013, p. 6-7; Rohwer, 
2009, p.42-43).  
 
Furthermore, corruption can be classified as grand or petty depending on its magnitude. Grand corruption 
typically refers to acts taking place high up in the political hierarchy that affect policies and the 
functioning of the state. Petty corruption, on the other hand, mainly involves transactions of relatively 
lower value where public officials abuse their position in the interaction with ordinary citizens. This kind 
of street-level corruption often takes place in hospitals, schools, police stations and other bureaucratic 
offices. Even though the scale of the monetary transaction tends to be smaller than in the case of grand 
corruption, petty corruption can have devastating consequences for the affected individuals. According to 
the United Nations Development Programme, corruption affects the poor disproportionately (UNDP, 
2008; Transparency International, 2014).  Similarly, some researchers make a distinction between political 
corruption, which involves the political leadership, and bureaucratic corruption that occurs when the 
bureaucracy engages in corrupt activities (Tanzi, 1998, p.9).  
3.2 Measuring corruption  
 
Due to the fact that most aspects of corruption are illegal and that it often takes place in the hidden, it was 
long withheld that corruption is impossible to measure. However, during recent years numerous indices 
with the purpose of quantifying and ranking corruption have emerged. Among these, the most well known 
are Transparency International’s Corruption perceptions index (CPI), the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption (CC) and an index sold by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (OECD, 2013, p. 7-
9). 
 
Even though it is beneficial for both researchers, policy-makers and ordinary citizens that some 
measurement tools are now available, the indicators should be used with caution. Apart from that the word 
“corruption” is generally included in the title, the indices capture different aspects of corruption and the 
methodologies employed when constructing them vary significantly from case to case. The CPI and World 
Bank’s Control of Corruption are based on the public’s perceptions regarding the extent of the problem 
(UNDP, 2008, p.3-34). Some argue that subjective metrics like these are unreliable and do not adequately 
capture reality. However, in most cases corruption leaves no trail and therefore perceptions may be the 
best, or only, alternative. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, the architects behind the Control of Corruption 
index, also argue that perceptions, impressions and views shape the actions of citizens and firms. For 
example, if people regard the police force as corrupt, they will to a lesser extent seek their services if 
subject to crime. In addition, objective and fact-based measures may appear attractive, but tend to be 
based on legal text and fail to capture what takes place on the ground. For these reasons, an indicator 
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based on perceptions may be desirable when seeking to measure the degree of corruption (Kaufmann et 
al., 2010, p. 16-20).  
 
However, since no international consensus regarding the precise definition of corruption exists, cross-
country comparisons using indicators like those described above can be misleading and it can be hard to 
identify what is being assessed (UNDP, 2008, p. 11-15). It is often the case that a specific form of 
corruption is legal in one country but illegal in another. Obviously this will have an impact on the answers 
given in surveys and opinion polls. Similarly, cultural norms regarding what is considered to be normal 
behaviour are likely to influence the outcome (Kaufman et al., 2010, p.18-20).  
 
For the purpose of my empirical investigation I have chosen to use the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption (CC) indicator. This is a composite index based on 21 different surveys and assessments, 
where answers from both households, experts and firms have been included. The index ranges from -2,5 to 
+2,5 where a higher score signifies a higher control of corruption, i.e. a lower degree of overall corruption. 
The CC seeks to measure “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.” 
(Kaufman et al., 2010, p.4) It also assesses how effectively a country’s policy and institutional framework 
combats corruption (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2014).  
 
The Control of Corruption indicator is frequently used in the empirical literature. See for example Starosta 
de Waldemar (2010) and Méon & Sekkat (2005). The index is available for 215 economies during the 
period 1996-2012, enabling comparisons between countries and over time. Nevertheless, minor 
differences and changes in the index should be interpreted with caution. Depending on the availability of 
data, the sources used may differ from country to country. In addition, even when focusing on one 
economy, the composition of the sample may have been modified over time by adding a new source or 
removing an out-dated one. The weights used to aggregate different individual sources could also have 
changed. Hence, if one country receives a slightly lower score than another, this does not guarantee that 
corruption is more prevalent in the former. Similarly, an improvement from one year to another in the 
variable may not reflect an actual decrease in the level of corruption (Kaufman et al. 2010, p.5-20). 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) recommend using the index in order to identify broad trends over 
a longer period of time, such as a decade.   
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3.3 Corruption around the world  
 
 
Graph 1 – the geographical distribution of corruption 
Source: The World Bank (2014), World Wide Governance Indicators 
 
The image above displays the prevalence of corruption around the world, where countries are ranked 
according to their score on the Control of Corruption index in the year 2012. As can be observed, sub-
Saharan Africa exhibits the highest levels, but corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Asia and South 
America too.  
3.4 Corruption and export diversification  
 
A substantial body of research has found that corruption hampers economic output and growth through 
various transmission mechanisms. For instance, studies conducted by Mauro (1995), Davoodi & Tanzi 
(1997) and Mo (2001) point to a negative relationship between the two. However, very few have sought to 
investigate whether corruption also affects the level of export diversification. With this thesis I hope to 
shed light on this particular question and thus make a contribution to the existing literature on the 
consequences of corruption. My theory postulates that corruption can be detrimental to export 
diversification through the following channels: 
 
 Private investments 
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 Innovation, entrepreneurship and human capital 
 Public expenditures 
 The legitimacy of the state 
 
However, it is likely that several other mechanisms exist that I do not account for in this thesis.   
 
Private investments 
 
Numerous researchers have investigated the link between corruption and private investment, which is 
considered to be one of the main mechanisms through which corruption hampers economic activity. In a 
widely cited report, Mauro (1995) finds a robust negative relationship between the two. Studies by 
Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2004) and Mo (2001) have come to the same conclusion. The additional costs 
caused by corruption act as an arbitrary tax on private investment. However, the corruption-tax is more 
harmful than a normal tax due to the secrecy and the large amount of uncertainty involved (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993). Another, obvious, difference is that the money does not go into the state budget and is then 
used for providing public goods. Apart from the direct bribe, corruption increases transaction costs since it 
causes delays and entails unnecessary procedures put in place with the sole purpose of extending the 
number of opportunities for graft (OECD, 2013). Moreover, due to the illegal nature of corrupt activities, 
contracts produced under these premises are unenforceable, which creates additional uncertainty (Boycko 
et al., 1996). Corruption hence reduces the profitability of investment by creating additional costs and 
increasing uncertainty, which will, all else equal, result in a reduced volume of overall private investment. 
This adverse effect of corruption also applies to foreign direct investment, which is regarded as an import 
way of transferring technology between countries (OECD, 2013).  
 
Higher, and especially unpredictable, costs of investing and doing business are likely to influence the 
number of products that are exported. Moreover, limited access to new technology due to lower levels of 
FDI may have an impact on the ability for countries to move up the value chain and start exporting more 
sophisticated products.  
 
Innovation, entrepreneurship and human capital 
 
As has been argued above, corruption acts as a capricious tax on investment. Furthermore, according to 
research by Murphy et al. (1993), public rent-seeking, which often takes on the form of corruption, affects 
innovation disproportionately. The reason is that entrepreneurs generally need a considerable amount of 
licences, permits and tax documents provided by the state in order to set up a new business. Since the 
demand for these is highly inelastic, the entrepreneurs become a natural and attractive target for public 
rent-seeking.  
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In contrast, established producers have in general already acquired the necessary documents and even if 
the state was to demand additional permits they tend to be less affected by public corruption for several 
reasons. For instance, it is more probable for them to be part of, or to have influential lobbies within, the 
ruling elite. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are outsiders without the necessary contacts, which will 
probably increase the likelihood of expropriation, or of them having to pay bribes. In addition, unlike 
established producers, entrepreneurs tend to be credit-constrained and may therefore find it difficult to 
raise the extra money required to pay these bribes. In consequence, they might be unable to enter the 
market at all. Furthermore, due to the risky nature of starting up a new business, the uncertainty of being 
allowed to keep future gains makes innovation overall less attractive. If the innovative project succeeds, 
the returns might be expropriated by the state, whereas in case of failure the entrepreneur has to bear all 
the costs (Murphy et al., 1993).  
 
Corruption can also hamper innovation by allocating talent from productive activities into rent-seeking 
behaviour. When entrepreneurs start a firm they improve and spread new technology, which promotes 
economic growth and potentially also leads to a higher degree of export diversification. However, as the 
pay-off of innovation falls and the gains from rent-seeking increases, entrepreneurs will have no incentive 
to invest in, and launch, new projects. Instead, they too will engage in corrupt activities since this is where 
the returns are the highest. In consequence, technological progress will stagnate (Murphy et al., 1991). 
When rent-seeking becomes a more lucrative business than productive work, the incentives for getting an 
education will also erode (Mo, 2001; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004). This matters for export diversification 
since a high level of human capital is likely to facilitate a shift from producing and exporting commodities 
into goods with higher value-added, i.e. vertical diversification.  
 
Public expenditures  
 
While there exists a substantial amount of literature supporting the negative link between corruption and 
the overall volume of private investments, the same relationship does not hold for public expenditures. In 
fact, as argued by Davoodi & Tanzi (1997), countries that exhibit high levels of corruption are associated 
with a larger share of public investments to GDP. However, the productivity of these investments are low, 
which suggests that corrupt decision makers tend to choose the items from which they can levy the largest 
bribes or which serve their particular political interest, regardless of the project’s productivity. The most 
“bribe-generating” investments are typically large, complex and capital-intensive infrastructure projects, 
so-called “white elephants”. Once completed, some of the new roads, bridges etc. are never used, while 
others are of such inadequate quality that they will be in need of constant reparation. In consequence, the 
ratio of public expenditure to GDP increases while the quality of the investments decreases.  
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Furthermore, due to the restriction of the public budget, large expenditures on unproductive items allocate 
resources away from other types of investments, such as in health or education. According to a report by 
Mauro (1998), public expenditure distortions caused by corruption have an especially negative impact on 
investments in the educational sector. This constitutes another channel through which widespread 
corruption may affect the level of human capital, which, as argued previously, probably influences the 
capacity to diversify. Likewise, public investments in the maintenance of existing infrastructure tend to be 
severely overlooked due to that these in general constitute a less lucrative target for graft in comparison 
with new grandiose projects (Davoodi & Tanzi, 1997; Mauro, 1998). For these reasons, a high share of 
public investments in corrupt countries does not automatically promote economic activities.  
 
Hence, corruption does not necessarily hamper the quantity of public expenditures, but rather distorts the 
way the money is used. Instead of building schools and and allocating funds to other productive items 
such as building decent roads, projects are chosen out of political and/or economic self-interest. This 
distortion is likely to have a negative effect on a country’s ability to innovate and export new products. In 
some cases though, the quantity of public expenditures will be affected too. For instance, corruption 
directly reduces tax revenues, so if the public budget has few other sources of income than from taxes, the 
state will find it hard to finance projects and other assigned activities (OECD, 2013). Furthermore, the 
embezzled funds often end up in a foreign bank account, negating any productive use they might have had 
in the country. For instance, billions of dollars in Nigeria have disappeared in this way during past decades 
(Kaufmann, 1997, s. 117).  
 
The legitimacy of the state 
 
Last but not least, corruption erodes trust in public institutions and can ultimately lead to a complete 
delegitimization of the state. In this scenario, political and economic instability is likely to increase which 
may have a negative effect on investments and productivity (Mo 2001; OECD, 2013). It is probable that 
an environment of great uncertainty also has an impact on the capacity to produce and export new 
products.  
 
Could corruption promote export diversification? 
 
The discussion above implies that there exist several channels through which corruption may hamper 
export diversification. However, most of the research within the field does not take other institutional 
factors into consideration and the debate regarding the perceived adverse effects of corruption on 
economic development has no trivial outcome. For instance, a strand of literature argues that corruption 
can enhance efficiency in countries where the institutional setting is poor. In this case, graft is regarded as 
a way of circumventing cumbersome regulations and excessive bureaucracy, which impede economic 
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activity. According to this so-called grease the wheels-hypothesis, which was first advanced by 
Huntington (1964) and Leff (1969), bribery serves as a necessary lubricant in an otherwise malfunctioning 
economic machinery. In this second-best world, corruption is considered as a way, sometimes the only 
way, of getting things done (Méon & Sékkat, 2005).  
 
The economic success of several highly corrupt countries in Asia has likewise put the harmful 
consequences of corruption into question. China, Indonesia and Thailand have all experienced rapid 
economic growth during the last decades, despite the endemic corruption that prevails. In the literature this 
phenomena is referred to as the Asian paradox (OECD, 2013, p. 14). Characteristically for many of these 
countries is that they also export a wide array of goods. For instance, China is considered to be the world’s 
largest manufacturing power (The Economist, 2012). 
4. Previous studies 
 
In the following section I provide an overview of the research that has treated the link (if one) between 
corruption and export diversification.  
 
In spite of having received substantially more attention during the last couple of years, the literature on 
export diversification remains limited. Unlike the case with economic growth, there exists no clear 
theoretical model with the purpose of explaining which factors determine a country’s level of overall 
specialisation. Previous studies within the field have relied on empirical experiments and these have 
mainly focused on the link between economic development, measured by the per capita income, and the 
level of product concentration. Two of these are Imbs & Wacziarg (2003) and Cadot et al. (2011), both of 
which have found a U-shaped pattern between the two. In contrast, the research conducted by de 
Benedictis et al. (2009) suggests that the relationship is monotonically decreasing; i.e. as a country moves 
along the path of development its exports will become increasingly less concentrated.  
 
A few researchers have sought to include additional variables in their analysis. See for instance the work 
of Agosin et al. (2012) and Osakwe (2007). However, very little research has been conducted on the 
perceived relationship between corruption and export diversification. Below follows a review of the 
existing literature. 
 
Parteka & Tamberi (2013) analyse which additional factors, apart from the level of economic 
development, that determine the degree of overall specialisation at the national level. The variables 
included range from proxies for the level of human capital and quality of institutions to measurements 
linked to a country’s trade situation and geographical location. All in all, their research encompasses 33 
independent variables among which corruption figures as one of the institutional factors. Their results 
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indicate that country size and distance to major markets are significant determinants of (sectoral) export 
diversification. In addition, countries with lower barriers to trade, in the form of for example restricted use 
of tariffs and quotas, demonstrate a lower concentration of exports. However, corruption does not appear 
to have a significant impact. In order to measure the degree of diversification, Parteka & Tamberi use the 
relative Theil index as well as the relative Gini index. Their data covers manufacturing exports for 60 
countries at different levels of economic development during the period 1985 to 2004. They employ 
several econometric estimation techniques in order to obtain their results, among them OLS and LSDV. 
Finally, instrumental variables are utilised in order to control for potential endogeneity. 
 
In his study from 2010, Starosta de Waldemar analyses to what extent rent-seeking, which often takes the 
form of corruption, affects product diversification. Covering 130 countries during the period 1995 to 2007 
and using a GMM estimation technique in order to control for endogeneity, he finds that rent-seeking has 
a significantly negative impact on a country’s ability to diversify its product base. Starosta de Waldemar 
mainly builds his case on the research conducted by Murphy et al. (1993), who explore the channels 
through which corruption hampers innovative activities and thus, growth. Starosta de Waldemar suggests 
that the same mechanisms that influence growth can be applied to the process that determines product 
diversification. The index Control of Corruption, compiled by the World Bank, is used as a proxy for rent-
seeking while the Theil and Herfindahl-Hirschman index serve as measures of export diversification.  
 
Héredia Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010) specifically focus on the factors that determine export 
diversification (and sophistication) in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, they seek to investigate whether 
these have contributed in a significant way to the improvement in fulfilling the Millennium Development 
Goals. Their study encompasses 48 countries between 1960 and 2005. The Herfindahl-Hirschman and 
Theil index are used as dependent variables in their regressions, along with several economic, 
geographical and institutional independent variables. The econometric method employed is pooled OLS 
with robust standard errors as well as estimation techniques including fixed effects and instrumental 
variables. Héredia Caldeira Cabral & Veigas’ results indicate that institutional factors such as corruption, 
transparency and accountability play a significant role for African countries’ ability to diversify. 
Moreover, the level of human capital appears to be an important determinant as well as the size of the 
economy and endowment structure. Oil producers, for example, tend to have less diversified exports. In 
line with similar studies, they find that higher levels of economic development are associated with a 
higher degree of diversification.  
 
Due to the fact that the reports mentioned above treat different time-periods, include different countries 
and employ different econometric estimation techniques, their results are not directly comparable. 
Moreover, it is possible that the type of index used in order to measure diversification affects the results as 
well as the choice of independent variables. The limited amount of research devoted to the subject also 
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adds to the fact that no general conclusion yet can be drawn regarding the impact of corruption on 
diversification. The studies conducted by Starosta de Waldemar, Parteka & Tamberi and Héredia Caldeira 
Cabral & Veiga provide different results on the matter. Whereas two of them find a significant negative 
link between corruption and diversification, the relationship is not robust in the third study.  
 
With this thesis I aim to shed further light on the impact of corruption on export diversification. My study 
differs from the existing research in several ways. For instance, I use a larger sample, which reduces the 
risk of bias and enables me to draw more general conclusions. I also differentiate between the effects of 
low, medium and high levels of corruption, which to my knowledge has not been done before. In addition, 
I test if corruption is more detrimental in sub-Saharan Africa relative the rest of the world. Similarly, I 
distinguish between the effect of corruption on export diversification for low-, medium- and high-income 
economies. This is important since low- and middle-income countries are considered to gain the most 
from export diversification (Hesse, 2008). Finally, in order to capture different dimensions of export 
diversification I utilise three proxies; a count of the number of exported products per country and year, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and Manufacturing as share of total exports.  
5. Data and methodology 
 
In this chapter I present the data and econometric model used in order to conduct my empirical 
investigation. Moreover, a rather extensive discussion regarding the choice of estimation technique is 
provided.  
5.1 Sample and data 
 
The sample used in order to conduct my empirical investigation consists of 157 economies
9
 at different 
levels of development. The availability of data has been the only criteria for selection, but I have strived to 
make the sample as large as possible since this generally leads to better estimates. Excluding observations 
does not necessarily cause problems if it is done in a random way. However, selection on the basis of 
existing data may result in a sample that is not representative for the population I intend to study 
(Wooldridge, 2009, p.323). For instance, it is more likely that data is missing for poor countries than for 
rich. Since low-income countries tend to have relatively more concentrated export structures (Imbs & 
Wacziarg, 2003), this is likely to affect the results. However, due to that a large share of the 157 
economies in my sample are developing countries, whereof 41 of them are located in sub-Saharan Africa, 
I do not consider sample selection bias on the basis of income to be a major concern. The geographical 
                                                        
9 I follow the World Bank and use “country” interchangeably with the words “economy” or “exporter”. Please note that the term 
does not necessarily imply political independence (World Bank, 2014).   
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dispersion is also rather satisfactory, though the Middle East is slightly underrepresented. A list of the 
countries included in the study can be found in the appendix.  
 
The period of investigation ranges between the years 2002 and 2012 and hence encompasses eleven years. 
The choice of time period is also largely based on the accessibility of data. For example, my proxy for 
corruption is only available on a yearly basis from 2002. In order to identify broader trends over time, and 
thereby draw more general conclusions regarding the effect of corruption on export diversification, it 
would have been desirable to examine a longer time period. However, a study covering eleven years will 
be able to provide some insights on the matter. For many countries, significant variation in both the degree 
of export diversification and the level of corruption can be observed, despite the relatively short time 
period.  
 
The data on export diversification is taken from the website of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). In contrast to studies involving the Gravity Model, which treats bilateral 
trade flows, my data is of unilateral sort. The main reason for this is that I want to use data of the same 
level of aggregation and not restrict my empirical investigation to flows between for example Africa and 
the EU. A detailed list of all the variables and their sources can be found in the appendix.  
 
5.2 Model specification and estimation technique 
5.2.1 Model specification  
 
In order to investigate whether corruption has an impact on export diversification I will use the following 
formula in my baseline regression: 
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where the dependent variable, ExpDiv, stands for export diversification. As mentioned earlier, a count of 
the number of products that an economy exports per year is my main dependent variable, but I will also 
run regressions with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and Manufactures as share of total exports. An 
important thing to note is that the HHI seeks to measure export concentration and a value close to 1 
would hence imply a very low degree of diversification. This regression is therefore likely to generate the 
opposite coefficient signs than when using the other proxies as dependent variables.  
 
GDPpc denotes the real level of per capita income and is included in order to control for the exporter’s 
level of economic development. According to Imbs & Wacziarg (2003) there is a U-shaped relationship 
Anna Åberg  24 
between domestic sectoral concentration and the level of per capita income. At the early stages of 
development countries diversify but after having reached a certain level of income they specialize again. 
In order to catch this non-linearity I have included the quadratic form of GDP per capita in the equation. 
Both the normal and the quadratic form are expressed in terms of purchasing power parity, which enables 
comparability between countries (Jones, 2002, p.6).  
 
Investments, here proxied as gross capital formation relative to GDP, are considered to be of great 
importance for export diversification (UNECA, 2007) and I expect to find a positive relationship between 
the two. However, one could hypothesize that the effect largely depends on where the resources are 
allocated. Investments in the educational sector would probably lead to a higher level of export 
diversification whereas more capital to the industry in which the economy has a comparative advantage 
would have the opposite effect. There could also be a difference between the impact of public and private 
investment. Gross capital formation relative to GDP measures only the quantity of investments (public and 
private summed together), hence the allocation of expenditures is a factor I will not be able to control for.  
 
Research conducted by Osakwe (2007), Parteka & Tamberi (2013) and Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010) 
suggest that high transport costs hamper export diversification. Certain geographical characteristics, such 
as being landlocked, are often associated with increased costs of this sort. I have therefore included a 
dummy variable in my econometric equation that takes on the value of 1 if a country does not have access 
to the sea. However, well-developed infrastructure can substantially reduce transportation costs and may 
therefore also counteract unfavourable features related to geographic location (Limao & Venables, 1999). 
Lower transportation costs obviously benefit countries that have access to the sea as well. I follow Osakwe 
(2007) and use the density of telephone lines per 100 people as a proxy for the quality of infrastructure.
10
  
 
Openness to trade is measured as the share of total trade (imports plus exports) relative to GDP. This 
variable is included with the purpose of capturing, however imperfectly, aspects of the exporting country’s 
trade policy (UNECA 2007) and the trade barriers its exports face on the international market. The effect 
of trade liberalisation on export diversification is ambiguous and there is no consensus among researchers 
on the matter. On the one hand, a world without barriers might promote specialisation according to 
comparative advantage. Indeed, Agosin et al. (2012) find that openness to trade hampers export 
diversification. On the other hand, the opposite could also be argued.  
 
The size of the domestic economy is likely to influence the degree of export diversification, where a larger 
number of producers and a bigger internal market would lead to a more differentiated product base 
(Starosta de Waldemar, 2010). I use the country’s real Gross Domestic Product in order to control for this, 
                                                        
10 It would have been desirable to also include density of roads or a similar variable, but this was not possible due to lack of data.  
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which is a standard method within the empirical literature on diversification (Parteka & Tamberi, 2013; 
Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2013). Population size is sometimes used as an alternative measure
11
, but due to 
problems arising from multicollinearity I will not incorporate this in my model.    
 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the World Bank’s index Control of corruption is used as a proxy for 
the level of corruption. For ease of interpretation, I have rescaled it so that it now ranges from 0 to 5, 
where a higher score still signifies a lower level of corruption
12
.   
 
Finally, in order to control for major global events that have occurred during the period of my 
investigation and which are likely to have had an impact on export diversification, I have included dummy 
variables for the years 2003 to 2012. In the econometric equation, these dummies are written as   . An 
example of such an event is the financial crisis.  
 
Since no clear theoretical model with the purpose of explaining the determinants of export diversification 
exists, my choice of control variables has largely been guided by previous empirical studies conducted 
within the field. However, due to (yet again) the insufficiency of the data available, some variables that I 
consider to be of relevance have been left out. For instance, factors such as human capital, macroeconomic 
stability and the endowment structure are likely to influence export diversification. Nevertheless, 
including all potentially relevant variables in the econometric equation would have reduced the sample 
size dramatically where the least developed countries would have been the first to go. Confronted with this 
trade-off I chose to keep as many countries as possible in the sample, to the detriment of a larger number 
of explanatory variables. To a certain extent the omission will be compensated for by the inclusion of 
country-specific fixed effects, something I will elaborate on under the heading “estimation technique”.   
 
5.2.2 Estimation technique 
Choice of estimator  
 
The Gravity Model is often used for analysing bilateral trade flows. My econometric equation differs from 
the traditional model in the sense that I use unilateral data and include several additional explanatory 
variables. However, both models focus on trade flows and the estimation technique employed is basically 
the same. The standard way of estimating the Gravity model, and constant-elasticity models in general, is 
to transform the multiplicative equation by taking the logarithms. This procedure will yield the following 
log-linear model, which can be estimated with OLS:  
 
                                                        
11 See, for example, Héredia Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010) and Starosta de Waldemar (2010) 
12 Or, put differently, a higher control of corruption.  
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where            
 
However, in my case, there are numerous reasons to why OLS is only the second (or third) best estimator. 
The first reason concerns the nature of my main dependent variable, the number of exported products, 
which is a count. OLS assumes that the error terms are normally distributed, but in models such as mine 
where the dependent variable is discrete, this assumption rarely holds. Normality generally applies to 
continuous variables that can take on approximately all values, whereas counts take on few and figure 
within a limited range
13
 (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 117, 596). Instead, when analysing count data it is common 
to presuppose that the dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution with mean and variance equal to 
µ. The Poisson regression is estimated by maximum likelihood, or pseudo-maximum-likelihood if the 
main assumption of the model, that of equi-dispersion, is violated. Equi-dispersion is something I will 
return to.  
 
Furthermore, regardless of whether the dependent variable is a count or not, several researchers have 
argued against estimating the Gravity model, and other constant elasticity models, in their log-linear form 
using OLS. See for example the work of Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006), Wilhelmsson & Westerlund 
(2011) and Burger et al. (2009). They argue that the logarithmic transformation undertaken in order to 
make the model linear in parameters, which is a prerequisite for OLS, may result in biased and inefficient 
estimates. For instance, there is a possibility, even though it is rather small in my case, for the dependent 
variable to take on the value zero. Since the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, the observations where 
the dependent variable takes on this value will have to be dropped or slightly modified. This could 
potentially lead to inconsistent estimators of the variable coefficients (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 
s.643). Maintaining and estimating the equation in its multiplicative form eliminates the problem.  
 
Another complication arises when the data exhibits heteroskedasticity, which is often the case with count 
data and trade flows in general (Wooldridge, 2009, p.596; Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). 
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the error term is not constant for all observations. If this is 
the case, OLS is generally inefficient and the standard errors of the coefficients will be invalid. Hypothesis 
testing will thus not be possible (Dougherty, 2011, p.283). However, Santos Silva & Tenreyro argue that 
in the case where constant elasticity models exhibit heteroskedasticity, but are nevertheless transformed 
and estimated with OLS, the estimators may not only be inefficient, but also inconsistent. This is a direct 
consequence of Jensen’s inequality which states that               (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 
                                                        
13 However, since I use a large sample where my dependent variable figures within the range 4-260, the distribution may in fact 
not be that different from the normal distribution.  
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p. 644, 641). Instead the authors suggest preserving the equation in its multiplicative form and employing 
a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood estimation technique. This is something Westerlund & 
Wilhelmsson (2011) and Burger et al. (2009) also recommend. The PPMLE
14
 will be consistent in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity as well as eliminate the problem with zero values. This estimator is the 
same as the one I referred to when discussing count data.  
 
In order for the PPMLE to be consistent, all that is required is for the conditional mean to be correctly 
specified. Hence, the data does not even have to follow the Poisson distribution (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 
p. 644). In fact, this is seldom the case due to the restrictive nature of the Poisson. In particular, for a 
variable to follow this distribution its variance has to equal its mean (equi-dispersion): 
 
                            
 
If the variance is larger than the mean there is over-dispersion in the data, which will cause the standard 
errors of the coefficients to be invalid. The normal Poisson MLE would still be a consistent estimator, but 
inference would generate biased results. A common way of estimating count data models in the presence 
of over-dispersion is to run a Negative Binomial regression instead of the Poisson, since this model is less 
restrictive. An alternative way, as mentioned above, is to use the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
estimator.  
 
In summary, since the PPMLE has several advantages over OLS and is more appropriate for analysing 
count data, this will be my main choice of estimator. My model will therefore be preserved in the original, 
multiplicative form:
15
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Furthermore, as pointed out by Westerlund & Wilhelmsson, the PPMLE can also be applied to non-counts 
(2011, p. 642) and can therefore be employed when my model is estimated with alternative proxies for 
export diversification. However, to facilitate comparisons with earlier results in the literature, OLS will be 
used as a robustness control along with the Negative Binomial-MLE.  
 
                                                        
14 Poisson-pseudo-maximum-likelihood-estimator. 
15 As recommended by Santos Silvana & Tenreyro (2006), the model is estimated using STATA’s poisson 
command, with robust standard errors. The variables GDPpc, Investments, Infrastructure, Openness to trade, GDP 
and Corruption are estimated in their logarithmic form. 
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Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity  
 
The data used in order to investigate if corruption has an effect on export diversification covers 157 
countries during the period 2002-2012. This type of data, which contains both cross-sectional and time 
series dimensions, is called panel data, or longitudinal data. Panel data allows the researcher to examine 
the same units (people, firms, countries etc.) multiple times and has several benefits. For instance, the use 
of panel data can reveal patterns and behaviour that are difficult to identify when solely utilizing cross-
sectional data. In addition, and perhaps more importantly for this thesis, it provides a solution to the 
problem of omitted variable bias due to unobserved heterogeneity (Dougherty, 2011, p.514). In my case, 
unobserved heterogeneity can be described as country-specific factors that influence the level of 
diversification, but that for some reason have not been incorporated in my model. Some relevant examples 
are geographical location (where the distance to major markets could be of importance), the level of 
human capital and the country’s endowment structure (such as being land-abundant or having oil). Not 
including these in the regression may give rise to a specific kind of omitted variable bias.  
 
In order to solve the problem with unobserved heterogeneity, a regression using a fixed effects estimation 
technique can be employed. Doing so permits the equation to undergo a transformation where the 
individual mean is subtracted from the original form. In consequence, the country-specific, unobserved, 
effect will be erased if it does not vary over time. The procedure is called the fixed effects transformation, 
or the within transformation. However, using the fixed effects approach comes at a price. Most 
importantly, all variables that remain constant over time, including dummy variables, will be erased in the 
same way as the unobserved heterogeneity (Dougherty, 2011, p.518-519). Due to the fact that my model 
includes several dummy variables and that the level of corruption varies relatively little over the time-
period analysed, I will not employ the fixed effects estimation technique initially. However, in order to 
control for potential omitted variable bias due to unobserved heterogeneity this will be done as a 
robustness control.   
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6. Empirical results and analysis 
 
In this chapter I present and analyse my econometric results. The effect of corruption on export 
diversification is first tested on the whole sample. Afterwards I investigate if the elasticity differs 
depending on the country’s level of income and whether corruption is especially detrimental in sub-
Saharan Africa. Finally, I differentiate between low-, medium- and high levels of corruption.  
6.1 Non-parametric indications and the results of my baseline regression 
 
I begin my empirical investigation by simply plotting the relationship between corruption and export 
diversification. In the first graph I use the number of exported products as a proxy for diversification and 
in the second the Herfindahl Hirschman index. As can be observed in both graphs, the correlation between 
the two variables appears to be relatively pronounced, where higher levels of corruption are associated 
with lower degrees of export diversification. Obviously, correlation does not imply causality, but as has 
been argued earlier in this thesis, there exist several mechanisms through which corruption may affect 
export diversification. Note that in the first graph the upward slope implies that low corruption is 
correlated with a larger number of exported products. However, in the second graph a score close to one 
on the vertical axis signifies a high concentration of exports. The downward slope hence indicates that 
low corruption is correlated with a lower degree of export concentration, i.e. a higher level of 
diversification.  
 
Graph 2 – Corruption and Export Diversification 
Sources: UNCTAD (2014) and World Wide Governance Indicators, the World Bank (2014b)  
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Graph 3- Corruption and Export Diversification 
Sources: UNCTAD (2014) and World Wide Governance Indicators, the World Bank (2014b) 
 
I move on to the regression analysis where I control for the impact of other variables in order to conduct a 
more thorough examination. The White’s test indicates that my data is subject to heteroskedasticity, which 
constitutes a strong argument for choosing the PPMLE
16
 as my main estimator.  
 
The first column of Table 1 shows the output of my baseline regression. The results indicate that the 
exporter’s level of income, which is measured as GDP per capita expressed in terms of purchasing power 
parity, is an important determinant of diversification. An interesting thing to note is that both the regular 
and the quadratic form are significant, which implies that export diversification indeed follows the hump-
shaped pattern, as proposed by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). The coefficient before investments is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1%-level. As argued earlier in this thesis, investments probably play a 
critical role in promoting export diversification. However, where and how the money is invested is likely 
to be more important than the quantity. This is something that my proxy does not take into consideration, 
which may explain the negative sign
17
. Furthermore, having well-developed infrastructure and an open 
economy appears to promote export diversification. My results of also confirm that countries with a large 
domestic market export a wider range of goods. 
 
In the baseline regression, corruption is statistically significant at the 1%-level and the magnitude of the 
coefficient is 0,101. Even if export diversification is expressed in levels in the Poisson-equation, the 
independent variables written in logarithmic form can be interpreted as elasticities (Shepherd, 2012). 
                                                        
16 A likelihood ratio test also detects over-dispersion in the data, so it will be appropriate to use the Poisson-Pseudo-Maximum-
Likelihood-Estimator (PPMLE) and not the normal Poisson-MLE. 
 
17 Moreover, the level of investment shifts significantly from year to year and may affect export diversification only after some 
time. Using a lagged variable or the average rate of investment over a five-year-period may generate an effect that lies closer to 
reality. 
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Hence, my results imply that an amelioration of 10% in the control of corruption index
18
 leads to an 
increase of roughly 1% in the number of products exported. However, due to the rather arbitrary scaling of 
the index and the difficulties encountered when trying to quantify corruption, too much attention shall not 
be devoted to the exact magnitudes of the coefficients. Instead, my emphasis will lie on the coefficient 
signs (does corruption have a negative or positive effect on export diversification?) and on the p-values. 
The size of the estimates will mainly be used when comparing the effects of different levels of corruption, 
which will be done at a later stage in this thesis.  
 
Finally, being landlocked does not seem to inhibit export diversification. On the contrary, the coefficient 
sign is statistically significant and positive, which indicates that not having access to the sea promotes 
diversification. This rather un-intuitive finding may be a consequence of the wide range of economies 
included in the sample. For instance, a country like Switzerland does not have access to the sea but has a 
highly diversified export base. As emphasised in Collier (2007), the potential disadvantage of being 
landlocked probably depends on the infrastructure and the political stability of surrounding neighbours 
(Collier, 2007, p.53-57). While Uganda suffers from its geographical location, Switzerland does not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 An increase in the index signifies better control of corruption, which in reality would imply a reduction in the degree of 
corruption.  
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Table 1.  
Baseline 
regression 
 
        
Regression: Baseline 
Regression 
 
Robustness 
Control 
 
Fixed effects 
Robustness 
Control 
 
OLS 
Robustness 
Control 
 
Negative 
Binomial 
 
Robustness 
Control 
 
IV (2SLS) 
Robustness 
Control 
 
Lagged 
endogenous 
variable 
 
Robustness 
Control 
 
HHI 
 
Robustness 
Control  
 
Man.  
Exports 
Dependent 
variable: 
No. exported 
products   
 
(levels) 
 
No. exported 
products 
 
(log-form) 
No. exported 
products 
 
(log-form) 
No. exported 
products   
 
(levels) 
 
No. exported 
products 
 
(log-form) 
No. exported 
products 
 
(levels) 
The HHI 
 
 
(levels) 
Man. % of 
total exports 
 
(levels) 
Estimator:  PPMLE PPMLE - FE OLS Negative 
Binomial 
MLE 
 
OLS (IV) PPMLE PPMLE 
 
PPMLE 
GDPpc  0,921*** 
(0,000) 
2,137*** 
(0,000) 
O,836*** 
(0,000) 
0,780*** 
(0,000) 
3,098 
(0,214) 
0,892*** 
(0,000) 
0,506*** 
(0,003) 
1,662*** 
(0,000) 
GDPpc, 
quadratic 
-0,059*** 
(0,000) 
-0,132*** 
(0,000) 
-0,059*** 
(0,000) 
-0,056*** 
(0,000) 
-0,201 
(0,217) 
-0,057*** 
(0,000) 
-0,007 
(0,470) 
-0,105*** 
(0,000) 
Investments -1,222*** 
(0,000) 
0,022 
(0,275) 
-0,099** 
(0,021) 
-0,120*** 
(0,001) 
-0,090 
(0,676) 
-1,130*** 
(0,000) 
-0,061 
(0,114) 
0,025 
(0,755) 
Infrastructure 0,073*** 
(0,000) 
-0,003 
(0,854) 
0,078*** 
(0,000) 
0,074*** 
(0,000) 
0,046 
(0,069) 
0,074*** 
(0,000) 
-0,225*** 
(0,000) 
0,076** 
(0,044) 
Openness to 
trade 
0,026*** 
(0,000) 
0,044 
(0,186) 
0,415*** 
(0,000) 
0,369*** 
(0,000) 
0,275*** 
(0,002) 
0,261*** 
(0,000) 
-0,158*** 
(0,000) 
0,379*** 
(0,000) 
GDP 0,189*** 
(0,000) 
0,311*** 
(0,000) 
0,297*** 
(0,000) 
0,259*** 
(0,000) 
0,266*** 
(0,000) 
0,186*** 
(0,000) 
-0,141*** 
(0,000) 
0,129*** 
(0,000) 
Corruption 0,101*** 
(0,001) 
0,105* 
(0,063) 
0,114** 
(0,017) 
0,123*** 
(0,002) 
1,240 
(0,430) 
0,100*** 
(0,002) 
-0,584*** 
(0,000) 
0,751*** 
(0,000) 
Landlocked 0,066*** 
(0,000) 
- 0,154*** 
(0,000) 
0,009*** 
(0,000) 
0,010 
(0,908) 
0,065*** 
(0,000) 
0,054* 
(0,094) 
0,027 
(0,491) 
Constant -3,994*** 
(0,000) 
- -6,784*** 
(0,000) 
-4,426*** 
(0,000) 
- -3,750*** 
(0,000) 
0,103 
(0,898) 
-8,249*** 
(0,000) 
Number of 
observations 
1626 1626 1626 1626 130 1473 1625 1344 
R-squared 0,599 - 0,690 - 0,658 0,593 0,053 0,254 
***Significant at the 1%-level **Significant at the 5%-level *Significant at the 10%-level. Year dummies are included in all regressions except 
when performing the IV-estimation. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and the P-values are reported within brackets. 
 
 
The results from the baseline regression hence suggest that corruption has a detrimental effect on export 
diversification, which is here measured as a count of the number of exported products per country and 
year. However, before drawing any conclusions, the robustness of these preliminary findings should be 
tested, which I will do in the following three sections.   
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Robustness control with the fixed effects model 
 
As discussed at length earlier in this thesis, the exclusion of relevant variables from the econometric 
model may give rise to omitted variable bias. When using a large panel, like the one employed in my 
empirical investigation, it is likely that country-specific factors have an impact on the behaviour of the 
dependent variable. For instance, the level of human capital and the presence of natural resources may 
promote or hamper export diversification. By performing a fixed-effects regression I aim to control for 
these. Note that the fixed effects approach only takes into account factors that do not vary over the specific 
time-period, i.e. the years 2002 to 2012.
19
 
 
The estimates from the fixed effects regression can be found in the second column of Table 1. GDP per 
capita still carries the expected sign and is statistically significant both in the regular and quadratic form. 
However, several of the other control variables (investments, infrastructure and openness to trade) are no 
longer significant. A possible explanation for this could be that some of them do not vary much over the 
time-period studied. In consequence, the effect they may have on diversification will be erased by the 
within-transformation. For instance, this is likely to be the case for my infrastructure-proxy. Corruption, 
on the other hand, still carries the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 10%-level. The size of 
the coefficient is also roughly the same as in the pooled regression. This strengthens the results derived 
from the baseline regression.  
 
Robustness control with OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE 
 
Since the Poisson-pseudo-MLE is robust in both the presence of heteroskedasticity and over-dispersion, I 
have no direct reason to question the appropriateness of this estimator. I will, however, as an additional 
robustness control, test my results using OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE. Estimation with OLS 
facilitates comparisons with previous studies since this technique is the traditional way of analysing trade 
flows with the Gravity Model. While the Negative Binomial-MLE does not have the same robustness 
properties as the Poisson-pseudo-MLE, it may be more efficient if the data exhibits over-dispersion, which 
mine does (Dennis & Shepherd, 2007, p. 20, 27; Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2013, p.19).  
 
The estimates of these regressions are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 1. Since all 
variables are statistically significant and carry the same signs as in the baseline regression I will not 
elaborate on their interpretation. In some cases the magnitudes of the coefficients differ. For instance, 
OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE yields significantly higher estimates regarding the effect of GDP 
                                                        
19 Obviously, the level of human capital in an economy can increase or deteriorate. However, since my panel only covers eleven 
years I do not expect significant changes occur. Therefore the fixed effects regression will to a large extent be able to account for 
this factor.  
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and openness to trade on export diversification relative when estimation is done with the PPMLE. 
However, since the dependent variable does not undergo a logarithmic transformation in the Negative 
Binomial regression, this is probably not a consequence of heteroskedasticity
20
. The coefficient of the 
main variable of interest, corruption, is positive and statistically significant at the 1%-level with the 
Negative Binomial-MLE and at the 5%-level with OLS. This robustness towards the use of different 
estimators strengthens the results of the baseline regression.  
 
Robustness control using instrumental variables 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether corruption has an impact on export diversification. 
However, the direction of causality is sometimes hard to determine. Under certain conditions, it is possible 
that a high concentration of exports breeds corruption and not just the other way round. For instance, as 
touched upon briefly at an earlier stage, countries whose exports are dominated by a narrow range of 
natural resources often exhibit various institutional deficiencies, among which corruption figures. The 
rationale behind this is that many of these resources (oil and minerals in particular) are associated with 
large rents, which reduces the government’s need to raise taxes for income. When citizens do not pay for 
the provision of social services, their capacity to claim accountability of their leaders erodes. Without 
efficient checks and balances in place, rulers of rentier states may be tempted to buy electoral support and 
maintain their political power through patronage instead of winning it by providing public goods (Collier, 
2007, p. 40-49). Lack of diversification facilitates the capture of the rents by a powerful elite, which 
reinforces and creates additional rent-seeking (Starosta de Waldemar, 2010).  
 
The discussion above matters for my econometric results since endogeneity due to reverse causality may 
yield biased estimates and invalidate the standard errors. In order to control for this rather serious issue, an 
instrumental variable estimation can be undertaken. However, finding an appropriate instrument to replace 
the endogenous variable is no easy task. Most importantly, the instrument should be correlated with the 
endogenous variable, which is corruption in my case, but not with the model’s disturbance term. 
Furthermore, it should not be an explanatory variable in it’s own right (Dougherty, 2011, p.318). Within 
the empirical literature on corruption, an index of ethnic fractionalization has sometimes been used as an 
instrumental variable. While the logic does not apply to all, or perhaps even most, countries, it can be 
argued that in some regions such as many places in Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East, 
cleavages based on ethnicity may be correlated with a higher degree of corruption. History provides 
several examples of when an ethnic minority or majority, currently holding the position of power over a 
certain territory, governs in a way that benefits the own group to the detriment of other 
minorities/majorities. Ruling and maintaining political power through patronage and cronyism instead of 
                                                        
20 As argued in Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006), estimating the log-linear model with OLS may yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
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representing the whole “nation” has rather been the norm than exception in many cases. This is the 
rationale behind the possible correlation between ethnic fractionalization and corruption. On the other 
hand, there is no reason to believe that ethnic fractionalization should have any kind of impact on export 
diversification.   
 
The most up-to-date data on ethnic fractionalization I could find was of the year 2002
21
. Therefore I 
reduce my sample considerably
22
 and run a cross-sectional IV-estimation only on this specific year. The 
results are thus not directly comparable with those obtained from my baseline regression. In addition, the 
correlation between the index and corruption is rather small (-0,2486), implying that the degree of ethnic 
fractionalization is a relatively weak instrument. For these reasons, the estimates of the IV-regression 
should be interpreted with caution. The output can be found in the fifth column of Table 1. The coefficient 
before corruption carries the expected sign but is not statistically significant at the 10%-level. As 
mentioned above, this could be attributed to the fact that ethnic fractionalization is a weak instrument, but 
could also point to that the results of my baseline regression are not robust.  
 
An alternative technique for addressing the problem of reverse causality is to lag the potentially 
endogenous variable. Since the current level of export diversification does not affect corruption in the 
past, the issue of endogeneity may be reduced. I therefore lag the corruption variable one period and 
exclude the first year of investigation from the sample
23
. In contrast to the instrumental variable approach, 
the sample size remains relatively large.
24
 According to results of this regression, corruption inhibits 
export diversification and is significant at the 1%-level. The elasticity is also approximately of the same 
magnitude.  Note that I have only controlled for reverse causality in the relationship between corruption 
and export diversification. Other variables, such as GDP per capita, may also be subject to endogeneity.  
 
Robustness control using alternative measures for diversification 
 
Finally, I run two regressions where I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and Manufacturing as share of 
total exports as proxies for export diversification. As mentioned in the beginning of my thesis, the HHI 
measures the dispersion of trade value across an exporter’s range of products and economies that depend 
heavily on just a few items will receive a score close to 1. Manufacturing as share of total exports is 
included in order to more adequately account for vertical diversification. Due to lack of data, several 
countries are excluded from the sample whereof most of them are located in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
estimated coefficients can be found in the last two columns of Table 1. Corruption is statistically 
                                                        
21 See Bauhaug et al. (2014) in order to access the data 
22 From 1626 observations to 130.  
23 One period equals one year and the first year of observation is 2002.  
24 1473 observations. 
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significant and carries the expected sign regardless of which proxy for diversification that is used
25
. 
Hence, corruption both appears to promote export concentration and hinder the transition into exporting 
goods of higher value added.  
 
Discussion 
 
The results of the empirical investigation indicate that corruption has a negative impact on export 
diversification. This is consistent with the research conducted by Starosta de Waldemar (2010) and 
Héredia Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010). I consider my results to be relatively robust since corruption 
carries the expected sign and is statistically significant in seven out of the eight regressions. The result 
from the IV-estimation, where no effect of corruption could be identified, may be attributed to the fact that 
the index of ethnic fractionalization was a relatively weak instrument and that the sample had been 
drastically reduced. The estimated coefficient for corruption, when measured as a count of the number of 
exported products, ranges between 0,101 and 0,123. This implies that an amelioration in the control of 
corruption index by 10% increases the degree of export diversification by roughly 1%. However, as 
mentioned previously, the exact size of the elasticity is of little interest. What is of more importance is that 
the results of the baseline regression and those of the robustness controls point in the same direction and 
indicate that combatting corruption can play an important part in promoting both horizontal and vertical 
export diversification.  
 
Nevertheless, even though I consider my results to be robust, some caution should be taken before 
drawing too strong conclusions. For instance, despite the fact that that I control for the impact of country-
specific fixed effects, the model used might be incorrectly specified. Moreover, it is rather likely that 
corruption is correlated with other institutional deficiencies. This may unintentionally cause my index to 
be a proxy for “bad institutions in general”, rather than just corruption. In addition, the difficulties 
encountered when constructing the control of corruption index should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results.   
 
In summary, the core result of my empirical investigation indicates that corruption has a robust and 
negative impact on export diversification. Due to the limited amount of empirical evidence previously 
available, this finding makes a rather valuable contribution to the existing literature and may help to shed 
further light on the harmful consequences of corruption. I now move on to answer the other questions I 
posed in the beginning of this thesis.  
 
                                                        
25 A reminder to the reader; the Herfindahl-Hirschman index measures export concentration. I therefore expect corruption to 
have a negative sign.  
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6.2 Does the effect of corruption differ depending on the level of income? 
 
After concluding that corruption appears to have a negative impact on export diversification in general, I 
investigate if the magnitude of the effect differs depending on the exporter’s level of income. This is 
important since low- and middle-income economies are considered to gain the most from export 
diversification, whereas rich countries typically benefit from specialising (Hesse, 2008).  In order to 
differentiate between the magnitudes of the elasticities, I construct a dummy-variable for the group “low-
income” and another for “high-income”. I also create interaction-terms between these dummies and the 
corruption variable. The classification of what constitutes a “low-income” and “high-income” country is 
taken from the World Bank.
26
 Note that the parameters before the interaction-terms are the extra effects 
for low- and high-income countries whereas their elasticities are         (low-income) and     
    (high-income). The estimates can be found in the first column of Table 2. 
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The results suggest that the elasticity of corruption varies depending on the exporter’s level of income and 
the effect is greater the poorer the country. Comparing the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients 
demonstrates this tendency, where the elasticity is 0,204 for low-income countries, 0,144 for middle-
income and 0,015 for high-income economies
27
. The results are statistically significant for both low- and 
middle-income countries, but not significant at the 10%-level for high-income countries
28
. This means that 
while corruption impedes export diversification in low-and middle-income economies, no specific effect 
can be identified in high-income. The robustness of these findings will be tested in the following sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
26 The World Bank (2014) uses the following classification:  
Low-income countries: GNI per capita of 1,045$ or less 
Middle-income countries: GNI per capita of more than 1,045$ but less than 12,746$. 
High-income countries: GNI per capita of more than 12, 746$ 
 
GNI per capita is calculated according the Atlas method. For more details, please consult the World Bank’s website.  
 
27 0,144+0,060=0,204 (low income) 0,144-0,129=0,015 (high income).  
 
28 I perform a test of joint significance in order to determine whether the coefficients for the interaction-variables are statistically 
significant. 
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Table 2.  
Different 
levels of 
income 
 
    
Regression: Baseline 
Regression 
 
 
Robustness 
control 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
Robustness 
control 
 
OLS 
Robustness 
control 
 
Negative 
Binomial 
Model 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
No. exported 
products 
 
(levels) 
No. exported 
products 
 
(levels) 
No. exported 
products 
 
(log-form) 
 
No. exported 
products 
 
(levels) 
Estimator:  PPMLE 
 
PPMLE-FE OLS Neg. Bin 
GDPpc 0,680*** 
(0,000) 
2,273*** 
(0,000) 
0,636*** 
(0,001) 
0,596*** 
(0,000) 
GDPpc, 
quadratic 
-0,044*** 
(0,000) 
-0,140*** 
(0,000) 
-0,045*** 
(0,000) 
-0,042*** 
(0,000) 
Investments -0,136*** 
(0,000) 
0,022 
(0,263) 
-0,111*** 
(0,008) 
-0,133*** 
(0,000) 
Infrastructure 0,078*** 
(0,000) 
-0,003 
(0,848) 
0,079*** 
(0,000) 
0,077*** 
(0,000) 
Openness to 
trade 
0,267*** 
(0,000) 
0,044 
(0,179) 
0,417*** 
(0,000) 
0,371*** 
(0,000) 
GDP 0,192*** 
(0,000) 
0,140*** 
(0,000) 
0,301*** 
(0,000) 
0,263*** 
(0,000) 
Corruption 0,144*** 
(0,000) 
0,075 
(0,202) 
0,115* 
(0,091) 
0,145** 
(0,012) 
Low-income -0,024 
(0,644) 
-0,011 
(0,797) 
-0,066 
(0,349) 
-0,045 
(0,486) 
High-income 0,056 
(0,439) 
-0,048 
(0,436) 
0,004 
(0,971) 
0,051 
(0,645) 
Low-income* 
Corruption 
0,060 
(0,373) 
0,060 
(0,425) 
0,193* 
(0,051) 
0,133 
(0,103) 
High-income* 
Corruption 
-0,129** 
(0,032) 
0,067 
(0,294) 
-0,099 
(0,318) 
-0,134 
(0,136) 
Landlocked 0,068*** 
(0,000) 
- 0,154*** 
(0,000) 
0,095*** 
(0,000) 
Constant -3,118*** 
(0,000) 
- -6,143*** 
(0,000) 
-4,764*** 
(0,000) 
Number of 
observations 
1626 1626 1626 1626 
R-squared 0,601 - 0,693  
***Significant at the 1%-level **Significant at the 5%-level *Significant at the  
10%-level. Year dummies are included in all regressions and robust standard  
errors are used. The P-values are reported within brackets. 
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Robustness control with the fixed effects model  
 
According to the results of the fixed effects model, corruption does not hamper export diversification in 
low- and middle-income economies. However, it does seem to have a negative impact in high-income 
countries.
29
 These findings highly contradict the results of the pooled Poisson regression, according to 
which corruption is most detrimental to diversification in the low-income countries. The estimates of the 
fixed-effects model can be found in the second column of Table 2.  
 
The discrepancy of the results may indicate that country-specific factors, not accounted for in the pooled 
regression, caused the PPMLE to be biased. It was not corruption that hampered export diversification in 
low- and middle-income countries, but some unobserved parameter. However, in contrast to the regression 
used initially, the fixed-effects-estimator explains to what extent the dependent variable deviates from its 
individual mean and not how these means differ between countries. Put differently, the fixed effects 
model focuses on variations within the specific economy (Verbeek, 2012, p. 379). Hence, if the level of 
corruption in a country significantly falls between the years 2002 and 2012, this will be captured by the 
FE-estimator. This fact has important implications for my results. For instance, it is rather likely that rich 
countries have managed to reduce the level of corruption more during the period than low- and middle-
income countries due to more resources and better institutions. In some cases, the degree of corruption 
may have stayed the same during the eleven years of investigation. This does not imply that it is less 
detrimental to diversification, but that it simply has not been captured by the model.  
 
Robustness control with OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE 
 
The estimates of the OLS and Negative Binomial regression can be found in the third and fourth 
columns
30
 of Table 2. In contrast to the fixed effects model, these robustness controls strengthen the 
results of the pooled Poisson regression. Corruption carries the expected, positive, sign and is statistically 
significant for both low- and middle-income countries. No effect can, however, be observed for high-
income economies. The magnitude of the coefficient for middle-income countries is roughly the same 
regardless of estimation technique, but OLS estimates a relatively higher elasticity than the PPMLE and 
the Negative Binomial-MLE for the least developed countries. Hence, in accordance with the results of the 
pooled Poisson regression, estimation with OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE suggest that the effect 
of corruption on export diversification differs depending on the level of income and that the magnitude of 
the elasticity is largest for low-income countries.  
 
 
                                                        
29 The result is statistically significant at the 5%-level while the estimated coefficients for low-and middle-income countries are 
not significant at the 10%-level.  
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Discussion 
 
The empirical results indicate that the effect of corruption on diversification depends on the exporter’s 
level of income. While corruption impedes diversification in low- and middle-income economies, the 
effect in high-income countries is unclear. From a policy perspective, the finding is relevant since low- 
and middle-income economies are typically those who want to diversify. Making combatting corruption a 
priority in these countries, can potentially lead to significant diversification gains. The elasticity for low-
income countries is also higher than for middle-income, which indicates that reducing corruption is 
especially lucrative for this group of economies. However, since the results are not quite robust, further 
research is needed before drawing too strong conclusions.  
 
6.3 Is corruption especially harmful in sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
A special focus of this thesis lies on investigating whether corruption is especially detrimental to export 
diversification in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to test this, I follow the same procedure as earlier and 
construct a dummy variable for countries located in SSA. An interaction-term between this dummy and 
the corruption-variable is also created.  
 
             (                                     
         )          
  
               
  
                  
  
                     
  
       
  
              
   
                  
         
 
The output of the regression can be found in the first column of Table 3. The results suggest that 
corruption has a negative impact on export diversification in sub-Saharan Africa and that the effect is 
relatively pronounced. In comparison with the elasticity for low-income countries estimated in the 
previous regression, which was 0,204, the equivalent for sub-Saharan Africa is 0,527
31
. This implies that 
an amelioration of the control of corruption index by 10% would increase the degree of export 
diversification by roughly 5% in countries located in SSA. When controlling for this regional effect, 
corruption does not appear to inhibit export diversification in the rest of the world. Hence, these 
preliminary findings point towards that corruption is especially detrimental to diversification in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
                                                        
31 The elasticity for SSA: -0,031+0,558=0,527.  
 
I perform a test of joint significance in STATA using the following command: 
 
Test lncorruption+ssa*lncorruption=0 which generates Chi2=73,25 (0,000) 
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Table 3.  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
    
Regression: Baseline 
Regression 
Robustness 
control 
 
Fixed Effects 
Model 
 
Robustness 
control 
 
OLS 
Robustness 
Control 
 
Negative 
Binomial 
Model 
 
Dependent 
variable:  
 
No. of exported 
Products 
 
(levels) 
 
No. of exported 
Products 
 
(levels) 
 
No. of exported 
Products 
 
(log-form) 
No. of 
exported 
Products 
 
(levels) 
Estimator:  PPMLE 
 
PPMLE-FE OLS Neg. Bin - 
MLE 
GDPpc 0.675*** 
(0,000) 
 
2,145*** 
(0,000) 
0,482*** 
(0,001) 
0,475*** 
(0,000) 
GDPpc, 
quadratic 
-0.043*** 
(0,000) 
 
-0,132*** 
(0,000) 
-0,035*** 
(0,000) 
-0,034*** 
(0,000) 
Investments -0.148*** 
(0,000) 
 
0,022 
(0,275) 
-0,125*** 
(0,002) 
-0,143*** 
(0,000) 
Infrastructure 0.054*** 
(0,000) 
 
-0,004 
(0,843) 
0,052*** 
(0,009) 
0,068*** 
(0,000) 
Openness to 
trade 
0.272*** 
(0,000) 
 
0,044 
(0,200) 
0,418*** 
(0,000) 
0,375*** 
(0,000) 
GDP 0.190*** 
(0,000) 
 
0,309*** 
(0,000) 
0,295*** 
(0,000) 
0,260*** 
(0,000) 
Corruption -0.031 
(0,307) 
 
0,115** 
(0,057) 
-0,135*** 
(0,006) 
-0,077* 
(0,067) 
SSA -0.404*** 
(0,000) 
 
- -0,568*** 
(0,000) 
-0,426*** 
(0,000) 
SSA* 
Corruption 
0.558*** 
(0,000) 
 
-0,042 
(0,776) 
0,826*** 
(0,000) 
0,676*** 
(0,000) 
Landlocked 0.044*** 
(0,001) 
 
- 0,117*** 
(0,000) 
0,062*** 
(0,001) 
Constant -2,898*** 
(0,000) 
 
- -5,157*** 
(0,000) 
-4,001*** 
(0,000) 
Number of 
observations 
1626 
 
 
1626 1626 1626 
R-squared 0,610 - 0,707 - 
***Significant at the 1%-level **Significant at the 5%-level *Significant at the 10%-level. Year dummies are 
 included in all regressions and robust standard errors are used. P-values are reported within brackets. 
 
 
Robustness control with the fixed effects model  
 
When estimating the model with the FE-estimator, no effect can be observed for sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, in contrast to the results of the pooled Poisson regression, corruption now appears to hamper 
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export diversification in the rest of the world. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%-level. 
As discussed at length when employing the FE-estimator on different levels of income, a possible 
explanation for the contradictory results could be that the estimator focuses on differences within the unit 
of observation, which is “country” in my case.  
 
Robustness control with OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE 
 
Estimation with the Negative Binomial-MLE and OLS reinforce the core result of the pooled Poisson 
regression; namely that corruption is especially detrimental to export diversification in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, in the Poisson regression the elasticity for the rest of the world was not statistically 
significant, which meant that no particular effect of corruption could be identified outside SSA. In 
contrast, when estimation is done with OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE, this coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant
32
, which suggests that corruption still inhibits diversification in SSA but 
enhances diversification in the rest of the world.   
 
Discussion 
 
Estimation with the pooled PPMLE, the Negative Binomial-MLE and OLS strongly imply that the 
elasticity of corruption on diversification is larger for sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world. The 
magnitude of the coefficient ranges between 0,527 and 0,694
33
, which implies that countries in sub-
Saharan Africa can make significant diversification gains by reducing corruption. When controlling for 
the effect in SSA, corruption does not appear to impede export diversification elsewhere. In fact, 
according to the estimates provided by OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE increasing the level 
corruption would promote diversification in the rest of the world and not the other way round.  
 
Since corruption appears to be especially detrimental to export diversification in sub-Saharan Africa, it 
may be the case that other factors determine whether corruption is harmful or not. The institutional setting 
in general, as well as the intentions and capacity of the state may for instance play a role. Despite high 
levels of corruption, several Asian economies have diversified their exports and grown rapidly during 
recent decades. These countries have been characterised by the presence of a strong and growth-oriented 
government, often referred to as the developmental state. Even if corruption was, and still is, widespread, 
it is likely that it was controlled to a larger extent than in SSA and possibly even used for fulfilling the 
growth-objectives of the Asian state leaders (Milelli & Sindzingre, 2010).  
 
                                                        
32 The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1-% level with OLS and at the 10%-level with the Negative Binomial-MLE.  
33 0,527 when estimating with the PPMLE and 0,694 with OLS. 
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Yet again, the level of corruption is very high in sub-Saharan Africa (the highest in the world) and it may 
simply be that this is the reason to why its impact on export diversification is so seemingly large in the 
region. In the next section I will explore the issue further by testing whether the effect of corruption differs 
depending on the prevalence of corruption in the exporting country.  
 
To conclude, my empirical results suggest that reducing corruption could have a significant impact on 
export diversification in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is in line with the research conducted by Héredia 
Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010) who also focused specifically on the region. However, since the 
corruption-variable for SSA is not significant in the fixed effects-model, further research ought to be 
undertaken in order to draw any strong conclusions. In addition, due to the heterogeneity of the sub-
Saharan countries, some economies are likely to gain more than others from combatting corruption in 
terms of export diversification. Hence, the results of my empirical investigation should be interpreted as 
preliminary implications and serve as a base for further research on the topic.    
 
6.4 Is there a non-linear relationship between corruption and diversification?   
 
The final question this thesis aspires to answer is whether there is a non-linear relationship between 
corruption and export diversification. In other words, I seek to investigate if the magnitude of the effect 
differs depending on the degree of corruption in the exporting country. An intuitive line of reasoning 
would be that high levels of corruption are most detrimental to diversification and that the elasticity is the 
largest for this group of countries. This could be due to that higher corruption probably entails relatively 
higher costs and more uncertainty than lower levels and that it may to a larger extent affect all levels of 
society as well as the functioning of the state. In contrast, low degrees of corruption may involve increased 
costs related to delays and having to pay bribes, but probably does not alter the decisions of policy-makers 
and create other profound distortions in society. Combatting corruption in countries with the highest levels 
could therefore entail large diversification gains. However, to my knowledge no empirical evidence exists 
in support of this theory and it is therefore relevant to investigate the issue further.  
 
I pursue two different strategies. The first one consists of simply dividing my sample into three groups of 
roughly the same size according to their degree of corruption (low, medium and high). I then construct 
dummy-variables for the different levels and multiply them with the original corruption term.
34
 This will 
enable me to distinguish between their elasticities and see whether they differ. In previous sections I have 
left the original corruption-term in the regression to serve as a reference category (for medium corruption) 
but now I exclude this variable. Therefore the estimated coefficient before each level of corruption (low, 
medium and high) can be interpreted as the elasticity for this specific group. The results indicate that the 
                                                        
34 For example: low corruption*lncorruption is the interaction-term for countries with a low degree of corruption.  
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degree of corruption plays an important role for the impact of corruption on export diversification. The 
elasticity for economies with low levels of corruption is 0,181 whereas the effect is 0, 348 for those with 
medium levels and 0,522 for those with the highest. The output of this regression can be found in Table 5. 
in the appendix.  
 
The second strategy consists of sorting the sample according to the score they have received on the control 
of corruption index. Economies with a score higher than 3,34 are classified as having a low degree of 
corruption and those with a score under 1,67 as having a high degree. The range of countries with a score 
between 1,67 and 3,34 are classified as having a medium degree. Note that there will not be an equal 
amount of observations in each group, which was the case in the first regression. The results from the 
second strategy of classification point to the same conclusion as in the previous regression, namely that 
the magnitude of the elasticity significantly differs depending on the prevalence of corruption in the 
exporting country. Hence, there seems to be a non-linear relationship between corruption and 
diversification. In this regression the least corrupt countries have an elasticity of 0,161 whereas those with 
medium levels have 0,301 and those with the highest 0,540. This implies that the countries with the 
highest degree of corruption have the most to gain from curbing it, in terms of export diversification. The 
estimates can be found in the first column of Table 4.  
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Table 4.  
Different levels 
of corruption 
(Strategy 2.) 
 
    
Regression:  Baseline 
Regression 
 
Robustness 
Control 
 
Fixed-
effects 
Model 
 
Robustness 
Control 
 
OLS 
Robustness 
Control 
 
Negative 
Binomial 
Model 
 
Dependent 
variable:  
 
No. of 
exported 
products 
(levels) 
 
No. of 
exported 
products 
(levels) 
No. of 
exported 
products 
(levels) 
No. of 
exported 
products 
(levels) 
Estimator:  PPMLE PPMLE-FE OLS Negative  
Binomial 
MLE 
GDPpc 0,725*** 
(0,000) 
 
2,134*** 
(0,000) 
0,643*** 
(0,000) 
0,622*** 
(0,000) 
GDPpc 
quadratic 
-0,047*** 
(0,000) 
 
-0,132*** 
(0,000) 
-0,047*** 
(0,000) 
-0,045*** 
(0,000) 
Investments -0,119*** 
(0,000) 
 
0,022 
(0,246) 
-0,092** 
(0,025) 
-0,116*** 
(0,000) 
Infrastructure 0,075*** 
(0,000) 
 
-0,003 
(0,877) 
0,079*** 
(0,000) 
0,077*** 
(0,000) 
Openness to 
trade 
0,262*** 
(0,000) 
0,043 
(0,191) 
0,413*** 
(0,000) 
0,365*** 
(0,000) 
GDP 0,191*** 
(0,000) 
 
0,321*** 
(0,000) 
0,299*** 
(0,000) 
0,259*** 
(0,000) 
Low Corruption 0,161*** 
(0,000) 
 
0,106* 
(0,062) 
0,135*** 
(0,000) 
0,168*** 
(0,000) 
Medium 
Corruption 
0,301*** 
(0,000) 
 
0,115** 
(0,043) 
0,288*** 
(0,000) 
0,322*** 
(0,000) 
High 
Corruption 
0,540*** 
(0,000) 
 
0,148** 
(0,028) 
0,484*** 
(0,001) 
0,543*** 
(0,000) 
Landlocked 0,061*** 
(0,000) 
 
- 0,1500*** 
(0,000) 
0,092*** 
(0,000) 
Constant -3,363*** 
(0,000) 
 
- -6179*** 
(0,000) 
-4,867*** 
(0,000) 
Number of 
observations 
1626 1626 1626 1626 
R-squared 0,606 
 
- 0,695 - 
 ***Significant at the 1%-level **Significant at the 5%-level *Significant at the 10%-level.  
Year dummies are included in all regressions and robust standard errors are used. P-values 
 are reported within brackets. 
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Robustness control with the fixed effects model 
 
The elasticities of corruption in countries with high and medium levels of corruption are not significant in 
the fixed effects model, when the classification is done according to the first strategy
35
. However, when 
the countries are divided after their score on the Control of Corruption-index, all levels are statistically 
significant. Moreover, in line with the results of the pooled Poisson regression, high corruption appears to 
be most detrimental to diversification.  
 
Robustness control with the Negative Binomial-MLE and OLS 
 
Estimation with OLS and the Negative Binomial-MLE yield similar results to those of the pooled Poisson 
regression, therefore I will not elaborate on their interpretation.  
 
Discussion  
 
According to my empirical results, all degrees of corruption (low, medium and high) hamper export 
diversification. However, the magnitude of the effect is the largest for highly corrupt countries. This is in 
accordance with what I expected and I consider the result to be robust. Even the difference between 
countries with medium levels of corruption and those with low levels is relatively pronounced. Hence, 
there are significant diversification gains to be made from reducing corruption for the “medium” category 
too. From a policy perspective, this finding is important since it suggests that not exclusively high levels 
of corruption are detrimental to diversification. Note that in countries with low corruption, such as in 
Finland, Denmark and Sweden, there is not much corruption left to eliminate. In conclusion, the 
relationship between corruption and export diversification appears to be non-linear and the magnitude of 
the elasticity is the largest for countries with a high degree of corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
35 A reminder to the reader: the first strategy consisted of dividing the countries into three groups of the same size according to 
their level of corruption. The second strategy consisted of dividing them after their score on the index, regardless of how many 
that landed in each group.  
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7. Summary and conclusions 
 
 
In this section I summarise my empirical results and draw conclusions.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether corruption has an impact on export diversification. In 
addition, I seek to determine if certain groups of countries have relatively more to gain from combatting 
corruption. More specifically, I analyse whether the magnitude of the elasticity varies depending on the 
exporter’s level of income and if corruption is especially detrimental to diversification in sub-Saharan 
Africa. I also allow for non-linearitites in the relationship between corruption and diversification. My 
sample consists of 157 economies at different levels of development and the period of investigation ranges 
between the years 2002 and 2012. The baseline regression is estimated with the Poisson-pseudo-
maximum-likelihood estimator.  
 
The results of my empirical investigation suggest that corruption is inversely related to diversification. I 
find that an amelioration of 10% in the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index translates into an 
increase of roughly 1% in the number of exported products. This core result is relatively robust to 
alternative estimation techniques and measures of diversification. Moreover, it is consistent with previous 
research conducted by Starosta de Waldemar (2010) and Héredia Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010).
36
 
However, due to the problems associated with quantifying corruption and to the rather arbitrary scaling of 
the Control of Corruption-index, the exact magnitudes of the estimated coefficients should be interpreted 
with caution
37
. From a policy perspective, the conclusion can hence be drawn that combatting corruption 
has the potential promote export diversification.  
 
Furthermore, I investigate if the effect of corruption on export diversification varies depending on the 
exporter’s level of income. This is an aspect that, to my knowledge, has not been analysed before. My 
findings indicate that both low- and middle-income countries gain from reducing corruption, but that the 
elasticity is especially high for low-income countries. However, these results are less robust and should be 
verified by future research.  
 
Similarly, I test if the elasticity of corruption on diversification is greater for sub-Saharan Africa than for 
other parts of the world. I find that an amelioration of the control of corruption index by 10% increases the 
number of exported products by roughly 5% for countries located in the region. In Ethiopia, for instance, 
                                                        
36
 Note that Starosta de Waldemar and I both use the World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator as a proxy for 
corruption/rent-seeking but that he mainly uses the Theil index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as measures of 
diversification, whereas I use a count of the number of exported products. We also employ different estimation techniques and 
size of the sample differs. Héredia Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010) find that corruption hampers diversification, but their sample 
only includes countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
37 Alternative estimation techniques used also generate slightly different results regarding the size of the elasticity. This is another 
reason for not devoting too much weight to the exact magnitudes of the estimated coefficients.  
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such a reduction of corruption would translate into seven
38
 more exported products. The figure does not 
sound impressive, but considering the relatively high aggregation of trade data used (3-digit according to 
SITC) and that these goods often represent an export value of more than 100 000 dollars (UNCTAD, 
2014), the diversification is of economic importance. When controlling for the effect in SSA, corruption 
does not appear to impede diversification elsewhere. My results hence point towards that corruption is 
especially detrimental in sub-Saharan Africa and that significant diversification gains could be achieved 
by reducing it. Nevertheless, even these results should be confirmed by further research.  
 
Finally, I investigate if there is a non-linear relationship between corruption and export diversification. I 
find that corruption impedes diversification at all levels, but that the elasticity is the largest for countries 
with high levels of corruption. Hence, I find empirical evidence supporting a non-linear relationship 
between corruption and diversification, where especially the most corrupt countries have to potential to 
make large diversification gains. 
 
A relevant aspect to emphasise is that the results of the last three regressions, though in need of 
verification, all imply that sub-Saharan Africa can achieve significant diversification gains by reducing 
corruption. This is due to that the continent both exhibits the highest levels of corruption in the world and 
contains the majority of least developed countries
39
 (LDC’s). The notion of corruption being a significant 
determinant of export diversification in sub-Saharan Africa is consistent with previous research conducted 
by Héredia Caldeira Cabral & Veiga (2010) and can have important policy implications. However, due to 
its multidimensional and all-encompassing nature, combatting corruption is obviously easier said than 
done. In addition, a plausible explanation to why high levels of corruption persist, despite the harmful 
consequences, is that the people in power benefit from the situation. Altering their incentive structure is 
likely to be of great importance in order to achieve any significant improvements in curbing corruption. 
Initiatives with the scope of increasing the transparency of public expenditures, such as the EITI
40
, have 
for some countries yielded positive results and can therefore, for instance, be promoted at a larger scale. 
Transparency is considered to be an important way of combatting corruption since it enables ordinary 
citizens to scrutinise the allocation of funds and thus hold their governments accountable (EITI, 2014).  
 
As emphasised, an important topic for future research is to further investigate the consequences of 
corruption for diversification in sub-Saharan Africa and to construct efficient policy tools that may help 
governments and other agents combat corruption.  In addition, certain kinds of corruption are potentially 
more harmful than others and distinguishing between these is a relevant topic for future research. 
Moreover, corruption is not a phenomenon that acts in isolation. In contrast, it is highly likely that other 
                                                        
38 7,45   
39 LDC stands for least developed countries and denotes those with lowest income. To see a list, please see UN (2014) 
40 EITI stands for Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, for more information visit EITI.org  
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institutions either reinforce or curb the effects it may have on export diversification. In order to make 
meaningful policy recommendations, placing corruption into the context in which it figures is important, 
in my opinion. An extensive cross-sectional econometric study may not be the best way of doing this. In 
fact, studies of a more qualitative nature that go deeper in untangling these institutional linkages would be 
a preferable next step.  
 
To conclude, in this thesis I find robust empirical evidence suggesting that corruption has a negative 
impact on export diversification. Furthermore, though in need of verification, my results indicate that both 
low- and middle-income countries gain from reducing corruption but that the effect is more pronounced 
for low-income economies. Similarly, I find that corruption has an especially detrimental impact on 
diversification in sub-Saharan Africa. However, even this result should be interpreted as preliminary and 
serve as a base for further research. Finally, I find that the magnitude of the elasticity of corruption on 
diversification varies depending on the degree of corruption in the exporting country. A relevant aspect to 
note is that all my empirical results point to that combatting corruption may translate into substantial 
diversification gains for countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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9. Appendix 
 
 
Variables and sources 
 
 
Variable 
 
Source 
No. of exported products 
 
A count – 3-digit SITC 
 
UNCTAD (2014) 
 
Trade Indicators 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
Concentration index, 3-digit SITC 
 
UNCTAD (2014) 
 
Trade Indicators 
Manufactures as share of total exports  
 
Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports) 
 
The World Bank (2014b) 
 
World Development Indicators 
 
GDP per capita, PPP 
 
GDP per capita, PPP constant 2005 international $ 
 
Estimated in the logarithmic form 
 
The World Bank (2014b) 
 
World Development Indicators 
Investments 
 
Gross capital formation as % of GDP 
 
Estimated in the logarithmic form 
 
The World Bank (2014b) 
 
World Development Indicators 
Infrastructure 
 
(Telephone lines per 100 people) 
 
Estimated in the logarithmic form 
 
The World Bank (2015b) 
 
World Development Indicators 
Openness to Trade 
 
Trade as % of GDP 
 
Estimated in the logarithmic form 
 
The World Bank (2014b) 
 
World Development Indicators 
GDP 
 
GDP (constant 2005 US$) 
 
Estimated in the logarithmic form 
 
The World Bank (2014b) 
 
World Development Indicators 
Corruption 
 
Control of Corruption Indicator 
 
Estimated in the logarithmic form 
 
The World Bank (2014c) 
 
World Wide Governance Indicators 
Landlocked 
 
1= The country is landlocked 
 
The author consulted a map 
   
 
Year dummies 2003-2012 
 
Created in STATA  
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Exporters   
    
Albania Dominica Lao People's Dem. Rep. Saudi Arabia 
Algeria Dominican Republic Latvia Senegal 
Angola Ecuador Lesotho Seychelles 
Antigua and Barbuda Egypt Liberia Sierra Leone 
Armenia El Salvador Lithuania Singapore 
Australia Equatorial Guinea Luxembourg Slovakia 
Austria Eritrea Macao  Slovenia 
Azerbaijan Estonia Madagascar Solomon Islands 
Bahamas Ethiopia Malawi South Africa 
Bahrain Fiji Malaysia Spain 
Bangladesh Finland Mali Sri Lanka 
Barbados France Malta Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Belarus Gabon Mauritania Saint Lucia 
Belgium Gambia Mauritius Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Belize Georgia Mexico Sudan 
Benin Germany Moldova Swaziland 
Bhutan Ghana Mongolia Sweden 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Greece Morocco Switzerland 
Botswana Grenada Mozambique Tajikistan 
Brazil Guatemala Namibia Thailand 
Brunei Darussalam Guinea Nepal Togo 
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Tonga 
Burkina Faso Guyana New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago 
Burundi Haiti Nicaragua Tunisia 
Cambodia Honduras Niger Turkey 
Cameroon Hong Kong Nigeria Uganda 
Canada Hungary Norway Ukraine 
Central African Republic Iceland Oman United Kingdom 
Chad India Pakistan United States 
China Indonesia Panama Uruguay 
Colombia Ireland Paraguay Uzbekistan 
Comoros Israel Peru Vanuatu 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Italy Philippines Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
Congo Japan Poland Viet Nam 
Costa Rica Jordan Portugal Yemen 
Côte d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Qatar Zambia 
Croatia Kenya Romania Zimbabwe 
Cyprus Korea, Republic of Russian Federation   
Czech Republic Kuwait Rwanda   
Denmark Kyrgyzstan Sao Tome and Principe   
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Table 5.  
Different 
levels of 
corruption 
(strategy 1) 
 
    
Dependent 
variable:  
 
No. of 
exported 
products 
(levels) 
No. of 
exported 
products 
(levels) 
No. of 
exported 
products 
(log-form) 
No. of 
exported 
products 
(levels) 
Estimator:  PPMLE PPMLE-FE OLS Neg Bin-
MLE 
GDP pc 0,785*** 
(0,000) 
2,145*** 
(0,000) 
0,657*** 
(0,000) 
0,636*** 
(0,000) 
GDP pc  
quadratic 
-0,049*** 
(0,000) 
-0,133*** 
(0,000) 
-0,046*** 
(0,000) 
-0,044*** 
(0,000) 
Investments -0,121*** 
(0,000) 
0,020 
(0,299) 
-0,091*** 
(0,026) 
-0,116*** 
(0,001) 
Infrastructure 0,063*** 
(0,000) 
-0,005 
(0,801) 
0,067*** 
(0,000) 
0,067*** 
(0,000) 
Openness to 
trade 
0,261*** 
(0,000) 
0,044 
(0,186) 
0,410*** 
(0,000) 
0,340*** 
(0,000) 
GDP 0,185*** 
(0,000) 
0,310*** 
(0,000) 
0,291*** 
(0,000) 
0,254*** 
(0,000) 
Low 
Corruption 
0,181*** 
(0,000) 
0,107** 
(0,056) 
0,173*** 
(0,000) 
0,202*** 
(0,000) 
Medium 
Corruption 
0,358*** 
(0,000) 
0,090 
(0,128) 
0,408*** 
(0,000) 
0,407*** 
(0,000) 
High 
Corruption 
0,522*** 
(0,000) 
0,104 
(0,109) 
0,583*** 
(0,000) 
0,597*** 
(0,000) 
Landlocked 0,065*** 
(0,000) 
- 0,151*** 
(0,000) 
0,089*** 
(0,000) 
Constant -3,601*** 
(0,000) 
- -6,213*** 
(0,000) 
-4,937*** 
(0,000) 
Number of 
observations 
1626 1626 1626 1626 
R-squared 0,608 - 0,699 - 
***Significant at the 1% level **Significant at the 5% level *Significant at the 10%  
level. Year dummies are included in all regressions and robust standard errors are used. 
P-values are reported within brackets 
 
